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Abstract
Active Peer-to-Peer (P2P) worms present serious threats
to the global Internet by exploiting popular P2P applica-
tions to perform rapid topological self-propagation. Active
P2P worms pose more deadly threats than normal scanning
worms because they do not exhibit easily detectable anoma-
lies, thus many existing defenses are no longer effective.
We propose an immunity system with Phagocytes — a
small subset of elected P2P hosts that are immune with high
probability and specialized in finding and “eating” worms
in the P2P overlay. The Phagocytes will monitor their
managed P2P hosts’ connection patterns and traffic vol-
ume in an attempt to detect active P2P worm attacks. Once
detected, local isolation, alert propagation and software
patching will take place for containment. The Phagocytes
further provide the access control and filtering mechanisms
for communication establishment between the internal P2P
overlay and the external hosts. We design a novel adaptive
and interaction-based computational puzzle scheme at the
Phagocytes to restrain external worms attacking the P2P
overlay, without influencing legitimate hosts’ experiences
significantly. We implement a prototype system, and eval-
uate its performance based on realistic massive-scale P2P
network traces. The evaluation results illustrate that our
Phagocytes are capable of achieving a total defense against
active P2P worms.
1 Introduction
The ability to gain control of a huge amount of Internet
hosts could be easily achieved by the exploitation of worms
which self-propagate through popular Internet applications
and services. Internet worms have already proven their ca-
pability of inflicting massive-scale disruption and damage
to the Internet infrastructure. These worms employ normal
scanning as a strategy to find potential vulnerable targets,
i.e., they randomly select victims from the IP address space.
So far, there have been many existing schemes that are ef-
fective in detecting such scanning worms [14], e.g., by cap-
turing the scanning events [18] or by passively detecting
abnormal network traffic activities [11].
In recent years, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) overlay applications
have experienced an explosive growth, and now dominate
large fractions of both the Internet users and traffic vol-
ume [12]; thus, a new type of worms that leverage the popu-
lar P2P overlay applications, called P2P worms, pose a very
serious threat to the Internet [2]. Generally, the P2P worms
can be grouped into two categories: passive P2P worms and
active P2P worms. The passive P2P worm attack is gener-
ally launched either by copying such worms into a few P2P
hosts’ shared folders with attractive names, or by partici-
pating into the overlay and responding to queries with the
index information of worms. Unable to identify the worm
content, normal P2P hosts download these worms unsus-
pectedly into their own shared folders, from which others
may download later without being aware of the threat, thus
passively contributing to the worm propagation. The pas-
sive P2P worm attack could be mitigated by current patch-
ing systems [28] and reputation models [25]. In this paper,
we focus on another serious P2P worm: active P2P worm.
The active P2P worms could utilize the P2P overlay ap-
plications to retrieve the information of a few vulnerable
P2P hosts and then infect these hosts, or as an alterna-
tive, these worms are directly released in a hit list of P2P
hosts to bootstrap the worm infection. Since the active
P2P worms have the capacity of gaining control of the in-
fected P2P hosts, they could perform rapid topological self-
propagation by spreading themselves to neighboring hosts,
and in turn, spreading throughout the whole network to af-
fect the quality of overlay service and finally cause the over-
lay service to be unusable. The P2P overlay provides an ac-
curate way for worms to find more vulnerable hosts easily
without probing randomly selected IP addresses (i.e., low
connection failure rate). Moreover, the worm attack traffic
could easily blend into normal P2P traffic, so that the active
P2P worms will be more deadly than scanning worms. That
is, they do not exhibit easily detectable anomalies in the
network traffic as scanning worms do, so many existing de-
fenses against scanning worms are no longer effective [32].
Besides the above internal infection in the P2P overlay,
the infected P2P hosts could again mount attacks to external
hosts. In similar sense, since the P2P overlay applications
are pervasive on today’s Internet, it is also attractive for ma-
licious external hosts to mount attacks against the P2P over-
lay applications and then employ them as an ideal platform
to perform future massive-scale attacks, e.g., botnet attacks.
In this paper, we aim to develop a holistic immunity sys-
tem to provide the mechanisms of both internal defense and
external protection against active P2P worms. In our sys-
tem, we elect a small subset of P2P overlay nodes, Phago-
cytes, which are immune with high probability and special-
ized in finding and “eating” active P2P worms. Each Phago-
cyte in the P2P overlay is assigned to manage a group of
P2P hosts. These Phagocytes monitor their managed P2P
hosts’ connection patterns and traffic volume in an attempt
to detect active P2P worm attacks. Once detected, the local
isolation procedure will cut off the links of all the infected
P2P hosts. Afterwards, the responsible Phagocyte performs
the contagion-based alert propagation to spread worm alerts
to the neighboring Phagocytes, and in turn, to other Phago-
cytes. Here, we adopt a threshold strategy to limit the im-
pact area and enhance the robustness against the malicious
alert propagations generated by infected Phagocytes. Fi-
nally, the Phagocytes help acquire the software patches and
distribute them to the managed P2P hosts. With the above
four modules, i.e., detection, local isolation, alert propaga-
tion and software patching, our system is capable of pre-
venting internal active P2P worm attacks from being effec-
tively mounted within the P2P overlay network.
The Phagocytes also provide the access control and fil-
tering mechanisms for the connection establishment be-
tween the internal P2P overlay and the external hosts.
Firstly, the P2P traffic should be contained within the P2P
overlay, and we forbid any P2P traffic to leak from the P2P
overlay to external hosts. This is because such P2P traffic is
generally considered to be malicious and it is possible that
the P2P worms ride on such P2P traffic to spread to the ex-
ternal hosts. Secondly, in order to prevent external worms
from attacking the P2P overlay, we hide the P2P hosts’ IP
addresses with the help of scalable distributed DNS service,
e.g., CoDoNS [20]. An external host who wants to gain ac-
cess to the P2P overlay has no alternative but to perform
an interaction towards the associated Phagocyte to solve an
adaptive computational puzzle; then, according to the au-
thenticity of the puzzle solution, the Phagocyte can deter-
mine whether to process the request.
We implement a prototype system, and evaluate its per-
formance on a massive-scale testbed with realistic P2P net-
work traces. The evaluation results validate the effective-
ness and efficiency of our proposed holistic immunity sys-
tem against active P2P worms.
Outline. We specify the system architecture in section 2.
Sections 3 and 4 elaborate the internal defense and external
protection mechanisms, respectively. We then present the
experimental design in section 5, and discuss the evaluation
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Figure 1: System Architecture
results in section 6. Finally, we give an overview of related
work in section 7, and conclude this paper in section 8.
2 System Architecture
Current P2P overlay networks can generally be grouped
into two categories [15]: structured overlay networks, e.g.,
Chord [22], whose network topology is tightly controlled
based on distributed hash table, and unstructured overlay
networks, e.g., Gnutella [1], which merely impose loose
structure on the topology. In particular, most modern un-
structured P2P overlay networks utilize a two-tier structure
to improve their scalability: a subset of peers, called ultra-
peers, construct an unstructured mesh while the other peers,
called leaf-peers, connect to the ultra-peer tier for partici-
pating into the overlay network.
As shown in Figure 1, the network architecture of our
system is similar to that of the two-tier unstructured P2P
overlay networks. In our system, a set of P2P hosts act as
the Phagocytes to perform the functions of defense and pro-
tection against active P2P worms. These Phagocytes are
elected among the participating P2P hosts in terms of the
following metrics: high bandwidth, powerful processing re-
source, sufficient uptime, and applying the latest patches
(interestingly, the experimental result shown in section 6 in-
dicates that we actually do not need to have a large percent-
age of Phagocytes applying the latest patches). As exist-
ing two-tier unstructured overlay networks do, the Phago-
cyte election is performed periodically; moreover, even if
an elected Phagocyte has been infected, our internal de-
fense mechanism (described in section 3) can still isolate
and patch the infected Phagocyte immediately. In particular,
the population of Phagocytes should be small as compared
to the total overlay population, otherwise the scalability and
applicability are questionable.
As a result, each elected Phagocyte covers a number of
managed P2P hosts, and each managed P2P host will belong
to one closest Phagocyte. That is, the Phagocyte acts as
the proxy for its managed hosts to participate into the P2P
overlay network, and has the control over the managed P2P
hosts. Moreover, a Phagocyte further connects to several
nearby Phagocytes based on close proximity.
Our main interest is the unstructured P2P overlay net-
works, since most of the existing P2P worms target the un-
structured overlay applications [2]. Naturally, due to the
similar network architecture, our system can easily be de-
ployed into the unstructured P2P overlay networks. More-
over, for structured P2P overlay networks, a subset of P2P
hosts could be elected to perform the functions of Phago-
cytes. We aim not to change the network architecture of the
structured P2P overlay networks; however, we elect Phago-
cytes to form an overlay to perform the defense and pro-
tection functions — this overlay acts as a security wall in a
separate layer from the existing P2P overlay, thus not affect-
ing the original P2P operations. In the next two sections, we
will elaborate in detail our mechanisms of internal defense
and external protection against active P2P worms.
3 Internal Defense
In this section, we first describe the active P2P worm at-
tacks, and then, we design our internal defense mechanism.
3.1 Threat Model
Generally, active P2P worms utilize the P2P overlay to
accurately retrieve the information of a few vulnerable P2P
hosts, and then infect these hosts to bootstrap the worm in-
fection. On one hand, a managed P2P host clearly knows
its associated Phagocyte and its neighboring P2P hosts that
are managed by the same Phagocyte; so now, an infected
managed P2P host could perform the worm infection in sev-
eral ways simultaneously. Firstly, the infected P2P host in-
fects its neighboring managed P2P hosts very quickly. Sec-
ondly, the infected P2P host attempts to infect its associated
Phagocyte. Lastly, the infected managed P2P host could
issue P2P key queries with worms to infect many vulnera-
ble P2P hosts managed by other Phagocytes. On the other
hand, a Phagocyte could be infected as well; if so, the in-
fected Phagocyte infects its managed P2P hosts and then its
neighboring Phagocytes. As a result, in such a topological
self-propagation way, the active P2P worms spread through
the whole system at extraordinary speed.
3.2 Detection
Since the active P2P worms propagate based on the topo-
logical information, and do not need to probe any random IP
addresses, thus their connection failure rate should be low;
moreover, the P2P worm attack traffic could easily blend
into normal P2P traffic. Therefore, the active P2P worms
do not exhibit easily detectable anomalies in the network
traffic as normal scanning worms do.
In our system, the Phagocytes are those elected P2P hosts
with the latest patches, and they can help their managed P2P
hosts detect the existence of active P2P worms by monitor-
ing these managed hosts’ connection transactions and traffic
volume. If a managed P2P host always sends similar queries
or sets up a large number of connections, the responsible
Phagocyte deduces that this managed P2P host is infected.
Another pattern the Phagocytes will monitor is to determine
if a portion of the managed P2P hosts have some similar be-
haviors such as issuing the similar queries, repeating to con-
nect with their neighboring hosts, uploading/downloading
the same files, etc., then they are considered to be infected.
Concretely, a managed P2P host’s latest behaviors are
processed into a behavior sequence consisting of contin-
uous 〈operation, payload〉1 pairs. Then, we can com-
pute the behavior similarity between any two P2P hosts
by using the Levenshtein edit distance [13]. Without
loss of generality, we suppose that there are two be-
havior sequences BS1 and BS2, in which BSi=1,2 =
〈〈oi1, pi1〉, · · · , 〈oij , pij〉, · · · , 〈oin, pin〉〉, where 1 ≤ j ≤
n, and n is the length of the behavior sequence. Further, we
can treat each behavior sequence BSi as the combination
of the operation sequence oi = 〈oi1, · · · , oij , · · · , oin〉 and
the payload sequence pi = 〈pi1, · · · , pij , · · · , pin〉. Now,
we simultaneously sort the operation sequence o2 and the
payload sequence p2 of the behavior sequenceBS2 to make
the following similarity score sim(BS1, B˜S2) be maxi-
mum. To obtain the optimal solution, we could adopt the
maximum weighted bipartite matching algorithm [27]; how-
ever, for efficiency, we use the greedy algorithm to obtain
the approximate solution as an alternative.

sim(BS1, B˜S2) =
∑n
j=1
s(o1j ,o˜2j)×s(p1j ,p˜2j)
n
s(o1j , o˜2j) =
{
1 if o1j = o˜2j
0 if o1j 6= o˜2j
s(p1j , p˜2j) = 1−
d(p1j ,p˜2j)
max(length(p1j),length(p˜2j ))
(1)
Here, B˜S2 denotes the sorted BS2; o˜2j and p˜2j denote the
jth item of the sorted o2 and p2, respectively; d(x, y) is
the Levenshtein edit distance function. Finally, we treat
the maximum sim(BS1, B˜S2) as the similarity score of the
two behavior sequences. If the score exceeds a threshold θd,
we consider the two P2P hosts perform similarly.
These detection operations are also performed between
Phagocytes at the Phagocyte-tier because they could be in-
fected as well though with latest patches. The infected
1For simplicity, we use the abbreviation 〈o, p〉 hereafter.
Phagocytes could perform the worm propagation rapidly;
however, we have the local isolation, alert propagation
and software patching procedures in place to handle these
infected Phagocytes after detected by their neighboring
Phagocytes with the detection module as described above.
Note that, our detection mechanism is not a substitu-
tion for the existing worm detection mechanisms, e.g., the
worm signature matching [5], but rather an effective P2P-
tailored complement to them. Specifically, some tricky P2P
worms may present the features of mild propagation rate,
polymorphism, etc., so they may maliciously propagate in
lower speed than the aggressive P2P worms; here, our soft-
ware patching module (in section 3.5) and several existing
schemes [7, 26] can help mitigate such tricky worm attacks.
Moreover, a few elaborate P2P worms, e.g., P2P-
Worm.Win32.Hofox, have recently been reported to be able
to kill the anti-virus/anti-worm programs on P2P hosts [2];
at the system level, some local countermeasures have been
devised to protect defense tools from being eliminated, and
the arms race will continue. In this paper, we assume that
P2P worms cannot disable our detection module, and there-
fore, each Phagocyte can perform the normal detection op-
erations as expected; so can the following modules.
3.3 Local Isolation
If a Phagocyte discovers that some of its managed P2P
hosts are infected, the Phagocyte will cut off its connections
with the infected P2P hosts, and ask these infected hosts to
further cut off the links towards any other P2P hosts. Also,
if a Phagocyte is detected (by its neighboring Phagocyte)
as infected, the detecting Phagocyte immediately issues a
message to ask the infected Phagocyte to cut off the con-
nections towards the neighboring Phagocytes, and then to
trigger the software patching module (in section 3.5) at the
infected Phagocyte; after the software patching, these cut
connections should be reestablished. With the local isola-
tion module, our system has the capacity of self-organizing
and self-healing. We utilize the local isolation to limit the
impact of active P2P worms as quickly as possible.
3.4 Alert Propagation
If a worm event has been detected, i.e., any of the man-
aged P2P hosts or neighboring Phagocytes are detected as
infected, the Phagocyte propagates a worm alert to all its
neighboring Phagocytes. Further, once a Phagocyte has re-
ceived the worm alerts from more than a threshold θa of its
neighboring Phagocytes, it also propagates the alert to all its
neighboring Phagocytes that did not send out the alert. In
general, we should appropriately tune θa to limit the impact
area and improve the robustness against the malicious alert
propagation generated by infected Phagocytes.
3.5 Software Patching
The analytical study in [24] implied that the effective
software patching is feasible for an overlay network if com-
bined with schemes to bound the worm infection rate. In
our system, the security patches are published to the partic-
ipating P2P hosts using the following two procedures:
Periodical patching: A patch distribution service pro-
vided by system maintainers periodically pushes the latest
security patches to all Phagocytes through the underlying
P2P overlay, and then these Phagocytes install and distribute
them to all their managed P2P hosts. Note that, we can uti-
lize the periodical patching to help mitigate the tricky P2P
worms (in section 3.2) which are harder to be detected.
Urgent patching: When a Phagocyte is alerted of a P2P
worm attack, it will immediately pull the latest patches from
a system maintainer via the direct HTTP connection (for ef-
ficiency, not via the P2P overlay), and then install and dis-
seminate them to all its managed P2P hosts.
Specifically, each patch must be signed by the system
maintainer [28], so that each P2P host can verify the patch
according to the signature. Note that, the zero-day vulner-
abilities are not fictional, thus installing the latest patches
cannot always guarantee the worm immunity. The attackers
may utilize these vulnerabilities to perform deadly worm
attacks. We can integrate our system with some other sys-
tems, e.g., Shield [26] and Vigilante [7], to defend against
such attacks, which can be found in [4].
3.6 Preventing Attacks on External Hosts
As much as possible, the Phagocytes provide the con-
tainment of P2P worms in the P2P overlay networks. Fur-
ther, we utilize the Phagocytes to implement the P2P traf-
fic filtering mechanism which forbids any P2P connections
from the P2P overlay to external hosts because such P2P
connections are generally considered to be malicious — it is
possible that the P2P worms ride on the P2P traffic to spread
to the external hosts. We can safely make the assumption
that P2P overlay traffic should be contained inside the P2P
overlay boundary, and any leaked P2P traffic is abnormal.
Therefore, once this leakiness is detected, the Phagocytes
will perform the former procedures for local isolation, alert
propagation and software patching.
4 External Protection
Our external protection mechanism aims to protect the
P2P overlay network against the external worm attacks. We
hide the P2P hosts’ IP addresses to prevent external hosts
from directly accessing the internal P2P resources. This
service can be provided by a scalable distributed DNS sys-
tem, e.g., CoDoNS [20]. Such DNS system returns the as-
Step 1 (H Æ P): generate SIH, store SIH || SIH || (null) 
Step 2 (P Æ H): generate k, generate SIP || SIH, SIP, k || check 
SIH, store SIP
Step 3 (H Æ P): retrieve <SIH, SIP>, solve puzzle || SIH, SIP, k,
solution, request || check <SIH, SIP>, check SIP, check solution,
store <SIH, SIP>, process request
where
y SIH: The session identifier of the external host . 
y SIP: The session identifier of the Phagocyte. 
y k: The difficulty level of the puzzle.
Figure 2: Adaptive and Interaction-based Puzzle Scheme
sociated Phagocyte which manages the requested P2P host.
Then, the Phagocyte is able to adopt our following proposed
computational puzzle scheme to perform the function of ac-
cess control over the requests issued by the requesting ex-
ternal host.
4.1 Adaptive & Interaction-based Puzzle
We propose a novel adaptive and interaction-based com-
putational puzzle scheme at the Phagocytes to provide the
access control over the possible external worms attacking
the internal P2P overlay.
Since we are interested in how messages are processed
as well as what messages are sent, for clarity and simplic-
ity, we utilize the annotated Alice-and-Bob specification to
describe our puzzle scheme. As shown in Figure 2, to gain
access to the P2P overlay, an external host has to perform
a lightweight interaction towards the associated Phagocyte
to solve an adaptive computational puzzle; then, according
to the authenticity of the puzzle solution, the Phagocyte can
determine whether to process the request.
Step 1. The external host H first generates a 64-bit
nonce NH as its session identifier SIH . Then, the exter-
nal host stores SIH and sends it to the Phagocyte.
Step 2. On receiving the message consisting of SIH sent
by the host H , the Phagocyte P adaptively adjusts the puz-
zle difficulty k based on the following two real-time statuses
of the network environment.
• Status of Phagocyte: This status indicates the usage
of the Phagocyte’s resources, i.e., the ratio of consumed re-
sources to total resources possessed by the Phagocyte. The
more resources a Phagocyte has consumed, the harder puz-
zles the Phagocyte issues in the future.
• Status of external host: In order to mount attacks
against P2P hosts effectively, malicious external hosts have
no alternative but to perform the interactions and solve
many computational puzzles. That is, the more connections
an external host tries to establish, the higher the probabil-
ity that this activity is malicious and worm-like. Hence,
the more puzzles an external host has solved in the recent
period of time, the harder puzzles the Phagocyte issues to
the very external host. Note that, since a malicious external
host could simply spoof its IP address, in order to effectively
utilize the status of external host, our computational puzzle
scheme should have the capability of defending against IP
spoofing attacks, which we will describe later.
Subsequently, the Phagocyte P simply generates a
unique 64-bit session identifier SIP for the external host
according to the host’s IP address IPH (extracted from the
IP header of the received message), the host’s session iden-
tifier SIH and the puzzle difficulty k, as follows:
SIP = HMACsecret (IPH |SIH |k) (2)
Here, the HMAC is a keyed hash function for message
authentication, and the secret is a 32-bit key which is pe-
riodically changed and only known to the Phagocyte itself.
Such secret limits the time external hosts have for com-
puting puzzle solutions, and it also guarantees that an ex-
ternal attacker usually does not have enough resources to
pre-compute all possible solutions in step 3.
After the above generation process, the Phagocyte
replies to the external host at IPH with the host’s session
identifier SIH , the Phagocyte’s session identifier SIP and
the puzzle difficulty k. Once the external host has received
this reply message, it first checks whether the received SIH
is really generated by itself. If the received SIH is bogus,
the external host simply drops the message; otherwise, the
host stores the Phagocyte’s session identifier SIP immedi-
ately. Such reply and checking operations can effectively
defend against IP spoofing attacks.
Step 3. The external host H retrieves the 〈SIH , SIP 〉
pair as the global session identifier, and then tries to solve
the puzzle according to the equation below:
h (SIH , SIP , X) = Y
(k) (3)
Here, the h is a cryptographic hash function, the Y (k) is
a hash value with the first k bits being equal to 0, and the
X is the puzzle solution. Due to the features of hash func-
tion, the external host has no way to figure out the solution
other than brute-force searching the solution space until a
solution is found, even with the help of many other solved
puzzles. The cost of solving the puzzle depends exponen-
tially on the difficulty k, which can be effortlessly adjusted
by the Phagocyte.
After the brute-force computation, the external host
sends the Phagocyte a message including the global session
identifier (i.e., the 〈SIH , SIP 〉 pair), the puzzle difficulty,
the puzzle solution and the actual request. Once the Phago-
cyte has received this message, it performs the following
operations in turn:
a) Check whether the session identifier 〈SIH , SIP 〉 is
really fresh based on the database of the past global session
identifiers. This operation can effectively defend against
replay attacks.
b) Check whether the Phagocyte’s session identifier SIP
can be correctly generated according to equation 2. Specifi-
cally, this operation can additionally check whether the dif-
ficulty level k reported by the external host is the original k
determined by the Phagocyte.
c) Check whether the puzzle solution is correct accord-
ing to equation 3, which will also not incur significant over-
head on the Phagocyte.
d) Store the global session identifier 〈SIH , SIP 〉, and act
as the overlay proxy to transmit the request submitted by
the external host. Note that, in our scheme, the Phagocyte
stores the session-specific data and processes the actual re-
quest only after it has verified the external host’s puzzle so-
lution. That is, the Phagocyte does not commit its resources
until the external host has demonstrated the sincerity.
Specifically in the above sequence of operations, if one
operation succeeds, the Phagocyte continues to perform the
next; otherwise, the Phagocyte cancels all the following op-
erations, and the entire interaction ends. More details about
the puzzle design rationale can be found in [4].
4.2 Comparison and Analysis
So far, several computational puzzle schemes [8, 10, 16]
have been proposed. However, most of them consider only
the status of resource providers, so they cannot reflect the
network environment completely. Recently, an ingenious
puzzle scheme, Portcullis [17], was proposed. In Portcullis,
since a resource provider gives priority to requests contain-
ing puzzles with higher difficulty levels, to gain access to
the requested resources, each resource requester, no matter
legitimate or malicious, has to compete with each other and
solve hard puzzles under attacks. This may influence legiti-
mate requesters’ experiences significantly.
Compared with existing puzzle schemes, our adap-
tive and interaction-based computational puzzle scheme
satisfies the fundamental properties of a good puzzle
scheme [10]. It treats each external host distinctively by
performing a lightweight interaction to flexibly adjust the
puzzle difficulty according to the real-time statuses of the
network environment. This guarantees that our computa-
tional puzzle scheme does not influence legitimate external
hosts’ experiences significantly, and it also prevents a mali-
cious external host from attacking P2P overlay without in-
vesting unbearable resources.
In real-world networks, hosts’ computation capabilities
vary a lot, e.g., the time to solve a puzzle would be much
different between a host with multiple fast CPUs and a host
with just one slow CPU. To decrease the computational dis-
parity, some other kinds of puzzles, e.g., memory-bound
puzzle [3], could be complementary to our scheme. Note
that, with low probability, a Phagocyte may also be com-
promised by external worm attackers, then they could per-
form the topological worm propagation; here, our proposed
internal defense mechanism could be employed to defend
against such attacks.
5 Experimental Design
In our experiments, we first implement a prototype sys-
tem, and then construct a massive-scale testbed to verify the
properties of our prototype system.
5.1 Prototype System
Internal Defense. We implement an internal defense
prototype system including all basic modules described in
section 3. Here, a Phagocyte monitors each of its connected
P2P hosts’ latest 100 requests. Firstly, if more than half
of the managed P2P hosts perform similar behaviors, the
responsible Phagocyte considers that the managed zone is
being exploited by worm attackers. Secondly, if more than
half of a Phagocyte’s neighboring Phagocytes perform the
similar operations, the Phagocyte considers its neighboring
Phagocytes are being exploited by worm attackers. In par-
ticular, the similarity is measured based on the equation 1
with a threshold θd of 0.5. Then, in the local isolation mod-
ule, if a Phagocyte has detected worm attacks, the Phago-
cyte will cut off the associated links between the infection
zone and the connected P2P hosts. Afterwards, in the alert
propagation module, if a Phagocyte has detected any worm
attacks, it will broadcast a worm alert to all its neighboring
Phagocytes; further, if a Phagocyte receives more than half
of its neighboring Phagocytes’ worm alerts, i.e., θa > 0.5,
the Phagocyte will also broadcast the alert to all its neigh-
boring Phagocytes that did not send out the alert. Finally, in
the software patching module, the Phagocytes acquire the
patches from the closest one of the system maintainers (i.e.,
100 online trusted Phagocytes in our testbed), and then dis-
tribute them to all their managed P2P hosts. We have not yet
integrated the signature scheme into the software patching
module of our prototype system.
Note that, in the above, we simply set the parameters
used in our prototype system, and in real-world systems, the
system designers should appropriately tune these parame-
ters according to their specific requirements.
External Protection. We utilize our adaptive and
interaction-based computational puzzle module to develop
the external protection prototype system. In this proto-
type system, we use SHA1 as the cryptographic hash func-
tion. Generally, solving a puzzle with difficulty level k will
force an external host to perform 2k−1 SHA1 computations
on average. In particular, the difficulty level k varies be-
tween 0 and 26 in our system — this will cost an exter-
Table 1: Network Traces of Gnutella
Trace 1 Trace 2 Trace 3 Trace 4 Trace 5 Trace 6
Number (abbr., #) of Phagocytes (Ultra-peers) 158, 985 209, 723 51, 400 51, 400 51, 400 14, 705
# of managed P2P hosts (Leaf-peers) 717, 025 1, 026, 231 512, 448 342, 757 257, 080 73, 539
# of Phagocytes : # of managed P2P hosts 22.17% 20.44% 10.03% 15.00% 19.99% 20.00%
# of Phagocytes : # of all P2P hosts 18.15% 16.97% 9.12% 13.04% 16.66% 16.66%
nal host 0.0 second (k = 0) to 24.728 seconds (k = 26)
on our POWER5 CPUs. In addition, the change cycle of
the puzzle-related parameters is set to 5 minutes. Yet, we
have not integrated our prototype system with the scalable
distributed DNS system, and this work will be part of our
future work.
5.2 Testbed Construction
We use the realistic network traces crawled from a
million-node Gnutella network by the Cruiser [23] crawler.
The dedicated massive scale Gnutella network is composed
of two tiers including the ultra-peer tier and leaf-peer tier.
For historical reasons, the ultra-peer tier consists of not only
modern ultra-peers but also some legacy-peers that reside in
the ultra-peer tier but cannot accept any leaf-peers. Specif-
ically, in our experiments, the ultra-peers excluding legacy-
peers perform the functions of Phagocytes, and the leaf-
peers act as the managed P2P hosts.
Then, we adopt the widely accepted GT-ITM [31] to gen-
erate the transit-stub model consisting of 10, 047 routers for
the underlying hierarchical Internet topology. There are 10
transit domains at the top level with an average of 10 routers
in each, and a link between each pair of these transit routers
has a probability of 0.5. Each transit router has an average
of 10 stub domains attached, and each stub has an average
of 10 routers, with the link between each pair of stub routers
having a probability of 0.1. There are two million end-hosts
uniformly assigned to routers in the core by local area net-
work (LAN) links. The delay of each LAN link is set to
5ms and the average delay of core links is 40ms.
Now, the crawled Gnutella networks can model the real-
istic P2P overlay, and the generated GT-ITM network can
model the underlying Internet topology; thus, we deploy
the crawled Gnutella networks upon the underlying Inter-
net topology to simulate the realistic P2P network environ-
ment. We do not model queuing delay, packet losses and
any cross network traffic because modeling such parame-
ters would prevent the massive-scale network simulation.
As shown in Table 1, we list various Gnutella traces that
we use in our experiments — with different node popula-
tions and/or different percentages of Phagocytes.
• Trace 1: Crawled by Cruiser on Sep. 27th, 2004.
• Trace 2: Crawled by Cruiser on Feb. 2nd, 2005.
• Trace 3: Based on trace 1, we remove a part of Phago-
cytes randomly; then, we remove the isolated Phagocytes,
i.e., these Phagocytes do not connect to any other Phago-
cytes; finally, we further remove the isolated managed P2P
hosts, i.e., these managed P2P hosts do not connect to any
Phagocytes.
• Trace 4: Based on trace 3, we remove a part of man-
aged P2P hosts randomly.
• Trace 5: Based on trace 4, we further remove a part of
managed P2P hosts randomly.
• Trace 6: Based on trace 1, we use the same method as
described in the generation process of trace 3. In addition,
we remove an extra part of managed P2P hosts.
6 Evaluation Results
6.1 Performance Metrics
In our experiments, we characterize the performance un-
der various different circumstances by using three metrics:
• Peak infection percentage of all P2P hosts: The ratio
of the maximum number of infected P2P hosts to the total
number of P2P hosts. This metric indicates whether Phago-
cytes can effectively defend against internal attacks.
• Blowup factor of latency: This factor is the latency
penalty between the external hosts and the P2P overlay via
the Phagocytes and direct routing. This indicates the effi-
ciency of our Phagocytes to filter the requests from external
hosts to the P2P overlay.
• Percentage of successful external attacks: The ratio of
the number of successful external attacks to the total num-
ber of external attacks. This metric indicates the effective-
ness of our Phagocytes to prevent external hosts from at-
tacking the P2P overlay.
6.2 Internal Defense Evaluation
In our prototype system, we model a percentage of
Phagocytes and managed P2P hosts being initially immune,
respectively; except these immune P2P hosts, the other
hosts are vulnerable. Moreover, there are a percentage
of P2P hosts being initially infected, which are distributed
among these vulnerable Phagocytes and vulnerable man-
aged P2P hosts uniformly at random. All the infected P2P
hosts perform the active P2P worm attacks (described in
section 3.1), and meanwhile, our internal defense modules
deployed at each participant try to defeat such attacks. With
Table 2: Experimental Parameters (Internal Defense)
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Initial percentage (abbr., %) of immune Phagocytes 100% to 50% 95% 95% 95%
Initial % of immune managed P2P hosts 10% 0% to 30% 10% 10%
Initial infection % of all vulnerable P2P hosts 10−3% to 50% 10−3% to 50% 10−3% to 50% 10−3% to 50%
Used traces 1 1 1, 2, 5, 6 3, 4, 5
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different experimental parameters described in Table 2, we
conduct four different experiments to evaluate the internal
defense mechanism.
Experiment 1 — Impact of immune Phagocytes: With
seven different initial percentages of immune Phagocytes,
we fix the initial percentage of immune managed P2P hosts
to 10%, and vary the number of initial infected P2P hosts
so that these infected hosts make up between 10−3% and
50% of all the vulnerable P2P hosts. Now, we can inves-
tigate the impact of immune Phagocytes by calculating the
peak infection percentage of all P2P hosts. The experimen-
tal result shown in Figure 3 demonstrates that when the ini-
tial infection percentage of all vulnerable P2P hosts is low
(e.g., < 1%), the Phagocytes can provide a good contain-
ment of active P2P worms; otherwise, the worm propaga-
tion is very fast, but the Phagocytes could still provide the
sufficient containment — this property is also held in the
following experiments. Interestingly, the initial percentage
of immune Phagocytes does not influence the performance
of our system significantly, i.e., the percentage of Phago-
cytes being initially immune has no obvious effect. This is
a good property because we do not actually need to have
high initial percentage of immune Phagocytes. Also, this
phenomenon implies that increasing the number of immune
Phagocytes does not further provide much significant de-
fense. Thus, we can clearly conclude that the Phagocytes
are effective and scalable in performing detection, local iso-
lation, alert propagation and software patching.
Experiment 2 — Impact of immune managed P2P
hosts: In this experiment, for 95% of Phagocytes being ini-
tially immune, we investigate the performance of our sys-
tem with various initial percentages of immune managed
P2P hosts in steps of 10%. The result shown in Figure 4 is
within our expectation. The peak infection percentage of all
P2P hosts decreases with the growth of the initial percent-
age of immune managed P2P hosts. Actually, in real-world
overlay networks, even a powerful attacker could initially
control tens of thousands of overlay hosts (1% – 5% in the
X-axis); hence, we conclude that our Phagocytes have the
capacity of defending against active P2P worms effectively
even in a highly malicious environment.
Experiment 3 — Impact of network scale: Figure 5
plots the performance of our system in terms of different
network scales. In traces 1, 2, 5 and 6, there are different
node populations, but the ratios of the number of Phago-
cytes to the number of all P2P hosts are all around 17%. The
experimental result indicates that our system can indeed
help defend against active P2P worms in various overlay
networks with different network scales. Furthermore, al-
though the Phagocytes perform more effectively in smaller
overlay networks (e.g., traces 5 and 6), they can still work
quite well in massive-scale overlay networks with million-
node participants (e.g., traces 1 and 2).
Experiment 4 — Impact of the percentage of Phago-
cytes: In our system, the Phagocytes perform the functions
of defending against P2P worms. In this experiment, we
evaluate the system performance with different percentages
of Phagocytes but the same number of Phagocytes. The
result in Figure 6 indicates that the higher percentage of
Phagocytes, the better security defense against active P2P
worms. That is, as the percentage of Phagocytes increases,
we can persistently improve the security capability of de-
fending against active P2P worms in the overlay network.
Further, the experimental result also implies that we do not
need to have a large number of Phagocytes to perform the
defense functions — around 10% of the node population
functioning as Phagocytes is sufficient for our system to
provide the effective worm containment.
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Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of
the latency penalty between external
hosts and P2P overlay via the Phago-
cytes and direct routing.
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Figure 8: Cumulative distribution of
the absolute latency difference be-
tween external hosts and P2P overlay
via the Phagocytes and direct routing.
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
Attack Frequency (Hz)
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
l E
xt
er
na
l A
tta
ck
s 
(%
)
Figure 9: Effectiveness of protection
against external worms attacking the
P2P overlay.
6.3 External Protection Evaluation
In this section, we conduct two more experiments in our
prototype system to evaluate the performance of the exter-
nal protection mechanism.
Experiment 5 — Efficiency: In this experiment, we
show the efficiency in terms of the latency penalty between
the external hosts and the P2P overlay via the Phagocytes
and direct routing. Based on trace 1, we have 100 external
hosts connect to every P2P host via the Phagocytes and di-
rect routing in turn. Then, we measure the latencies for both
cases.
Figure 7 plots the measurement result of latency penalty.
We can see that, if routing via the Phagocytes, about 30%
and 80% of the connections between the external hosts and
P2P hosts have the blowup factor of latency be less than
2 and 2.5, respectively. Figure 8 shows the corresponding
absolute latency difference, from which we can further de-
duce that the average latency growth of more than half of
these connections (via the Phagocytes) is less than 150ms.
Actually, due to the interaction required by our proposed
computational puzzle scheme, we would expect some la-
tency penalty incurred by routing via the Phagocytes. With
the puzzle scheme, our system can protect against external
attacks effectively which we will illustrate in the next ex-
periment. Hence, there would be a tradeoff between the
efficiency and effectiveness.
Experiment 6 — Effectiveness: In this experiment,
based on trace 1, we have 100 external worm attackers flood
all Phagocytes in the P2P overlay. Then, we evaluate the
percentage of successful external attacks to show the effec-
tiveness of our protection mechanism against external hosts
attacking the P2P overlay. For other numbers of external
worm attackers, we obtain the similar experimental results.
In Figure 9, the X-axis is the attack frequency in terms
of the speed of external hosts mounting worm attacks to
the P2P overlay, and the Y-axis is the percentage of suc-
cessful external attacks. The result clearly illustrates the
effectiveness of Phagocytes in protecting the P2P overlay
from external worm attacks. Our adaptive and interaction-
based computational puzzle module at the Phagocytes plays
an important role in contributing to this observation. Even
in an extremely malicious environment, our system is still
effective. That is, to launch worm attacks, the external at-
tackers have no alternative but to solve hard computational
puzzles which will incur heavy burden on these attackers.
From the Figure 9, we can also find that when the attack
frequency decreases, the percentage of successful external
attacks increases gradually. However, with a low attack fre-
quency, the attackers cannot perform practical attacks. Even
if a part of external attacks are mounted successfully, our in-
ternal defense mechanism can mitigate them effectively.
7 Related Work
P2P worms could exploit the perversive P2P overlays
to achieve fast worm propagation, and recently, many P2P
worms have already been reported to employ real-world
P2P systems as their spreading platforms [2, 19, 21]. The
very first work in [32] highlighted the dangers posed by P2P
worms and studied the feasibility of self-defense and con-
tainment inside the P2P overlay. Afterwards, several stud-
ies [6, 19] developed mathematical models to understand
the spreading behaviors of P2P worms, and showed that P2P
worms, especially the active P2P worms, indeed pose more
deadly threats than normal scanning worms.
Recognizing such threats, many researchers started to
study the corresponding defense mechanisms. Specifically,
Yu et al. in [30] presented a region-based active immuniza-
tion defense strategy to defend against active P2P worm at-
tacks; Freitas et al. in [9] utilized the diversity of participat-
ing hosts to design a worm-resistant P2P overlay, Verme, for
containing possible P2P worms; moreover, in [29], Xie and
Zhu proposed a partition-based scheme to proactively block
the possible worm spreading as well as a connected domi-
nating set based scheme to achieve fast patch distribution in
a race with the worm, and in [28], Xie et al. further designed
a P2P patching system through file-sharing mechanisms to
internally disseminate security patches. However, existing
defense mechanisms generally focused on the internal P2P
worm defense without the consideration of external worm
attacks, so that they cannot provide a total worm protection
for the P2P overlay systems.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed the deadly threats posed
by active P2P worms which exploit the pervasive and pop-
ular P2P applications for rapid topological worm infection.
We build an immunity system that responds to the active
P2P worm infection by using Phagocytes. The Phagocytes
are a small subset of specially elected P2P hosts that have
high immunity and can “eat” active P2P worms in the P2P
overlay networks. Each Phagocyte manages a group of P2P
hosts by monitoring their connection patterns and traffic
volume. If any worm events are detected, the Phagocyte
will invoke the internal defense strategies for local isola-
tion, alert propagation and software patching. Besides, the
Phagocytes provide the access control and filtering mech-
anisms for the communication establishment between the
P2P overlay and external hosts. The Phagocytes forbid the
P2P traffic to leak from the P2P overlay to external hosts,
and further adopt a novel adaptive and interaction-based
computational puzzle scheme to prevent external hosts from
attacking the P2P overlay. To sum up, our holistic immunity
system utilizes the Phagocytes to achieve both internal de-
fense and external protection against active P2P worms. We
implement a prototype system and validate its effectiveness
and efficiency in massive-scale P2P overlay networks with
realistic P2P network traces.
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